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Industrial combinations in Germany have been given many
different names by business men as well as by popular writers, but
there are really only two principal kinds: The &dquo; Kartell &dquo; and the
&dquo;Interessengemeinschaft&dquo; (association of interests).
The Kartell may be defined as an association of independent
establishments of the same trade, organized for the purpose of influ-
encing selling conditions and prices in their trade. For whatever
apparent purpose a Kartell may be formed, restriction of compe-
tition must necessarily result and a tendency toward monopoly be
ever present. As a rule, no single one of the various independent
owners or establishments which together form such a Kartell repre-
sents more than a small percentage of the whole industry. For
example, the &dquo;Stahlwerksverband,&dquo; which is a Kartell controlling
ninety-five per cent of the steel trade, embraces thirty-six inde-
pendent steel plants; the largest single plant in the &dquo;Stahlwerks-
verband,&dquo; however, is the Phoenix Steel Works, which does only
about eleven per cent of the whole steel business.
The Stahlwerksverband is one of the most highly developed
Kartells and for that reason as well as for its great size and importance
deserves more than a passing mention.’ In it the sale of the entire
output of all the members, which is limited by the Verband, is placed
in the hands and control of one central body, called the &dquo; Stahlwerks-
verband-Aktiengesellschaft,&dquo; i.e., the Steel-works Stock Company.
This body might be called the selling agent. It is capitalized at
$100,000. The shares are held exclusively by its organizers.
The Stahlwerksverband, considered as a whole, is the largest
industrial concern in all Europe with the exception of the Prussian-
Hessian railroad. The Stahlwerksverband represents through the
capitalization of its members about $325,000,000.
Paragraph 2 of the syndicate agreement states that &dquo;the object
1 This paper was written previous to the new development in the steel industry in Germany
(May, 1912).
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of the enterprise is the purchase and sale of iron and steel products
of all kinds, the purchase of industrial enterprises of all kinds and
the management of enterprises of all kinds intended for the storing,
selling and transporting of iron and steel products as well as a parti-
cipation in all such enterprises.&dquo; The Stahlwerksverband in spite
of the terms of this Syndicate agreement has not yet engaged in any
enterprises except the purchase and sale of iron and steel products.
This is in marked contrast to the coal syndicate which recently
has taken a financial interests in the transportation of coal and in
the coal business in general.
A highly developed Kartell, which like the Stahlwerksverband,
has a central sales agency, is generally called &dquo; Syndikat. &dquo; In
a Syndikat there is often nothing left to the discretion of the indi-
vidual plant owner but the method of production, for the purchase
of raw material as well as the sale of the finished product may be
determined by the association. And this is sometimes carried to
the extent of dictating to each plant owner the quantity and quality
of his production.
We often encounter the interesting fact that one concern is
a member of a great number of Kartells according to the number
of its products. The Phoenix Iron and Steel Works for instance
belonged at one time to twelve different Kartells, such as the coal,
pig-iron, rail, steel syndicates, etc. The disadvantage to the indi-
vidual Kartells resulting from this diversity of interest and the
conflicting influences which are thereby brought to bear within the
Kartells themselves are apparent.
The second kind of industrial combination which is known as
the &dquo;7M~~~~Mg~M~M~cAq/~,&dquo; or Association of Interests, is really the
most developed form of combination and the closest approach to
what in this country is called a trust, for in this association of interests
two or more independent establishments amalgamate, usually with
a profit-sharing agreement and sometimes with an exchange of
shares.
Having thus defined the three most common terms relating to
industrial combinations, namely &dquo; Kartell, &dquo; &dquo; Syndikat &dquo; and &dquo; Inter-
essengemeinschaft,&dquo; we come now to the question of the attitude of
the German people toward industrial combinations.
The majority of the German people of every class is in favor
of industrial combinations.
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This faith in industrial combinations seems to be due, first,
to the understanding of the economic necessity of such combina-
tions ; second, to the fact that the development of the German
industrial combinations has been logical, gradual and open. Such
development was possible because, as will appear later, it was from
the beginning fostered and not persecuted by the law-makers.
Combinations in Germany are economically due to the same
fundamental conditions of modem industrial life that have obtained
in America, namely, the increased facilities for communication and
production based on science and technic, as well as the birth of a
world market. Just as it was truly said of the American colonies at
the time of the Revolution that they must all hang together if they
were to avoid hanging separately, the present industrial situation
demands combinations. They are not an invention of capitalistic
egoism, but the children of necessity.
On December 31, 1908, all Kartells and syndicates in the iron
trade ceased. Cut-throat competition immediately ensued. The
manufacturers were happy if they earned expenses. The price for
pig-iron went down to $5 a ton. Chaos continued until the old
adage that misery loves company found another application, and
the warring producers joined together again in new agreements.
To illustrate that this growth was gradual it may be well to
show briefly the steps through which the Kartells developed.
The simplest and crudest form of combination is the &dquo;Kondi-
tionenkartell.&dquo; This is very often nothing but an informal agree-
ment. Its purpose is to better and unify selling conditions, and to
prevent credits of too long a duration, too high rebates, discounts,
etc. Agreements of this kind may still be found in the textile indus-
try, in which combinations have only recently begun to develop.
The second step is the &dquo;Price-Kartell.&dquo; The members make
up a price list and agree to respect not only certain selling condi-
tions but also prices. Such agreements go sometimes so far as to
divide the whole market among the members, by assigning to them
certain territory, or by limiting them to a certain amount or kind
of production.
I have already stated what the theorists call a &dquo;Syndikat;&dquo;
it is the &dquo;Selling-Kartell&dquo; (Verkaufskartell).
But even the Kartell in its highest form is not always powerful
enough to meet present-day contingencies, and the next step towards
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more powerful and at the same time more economic concentration
is the &dquo; association of interests&dquo; (Interessengemeinschaft). This is
illustrated by the amalgamation which is constantly going on in
Germany in the electrical and the chemical industries and in and
between the coal and iron industries.
The fact that there existed four hundred and fifty Kartells in
1902, embracing about 12,000 concerns, which number has increased
probably to nearly six hundred to-day, is ample proof that the pro-
ducers in Germany are in favor of combinations. But as the real
proof of the pudding is in the eating, or better, in the consuming
of it, it is most significant that the consumers in general have shown
their approval of this tendency. Thus we find associations not only
among the industrial consumers, as appears below, but also con-
sumers’ associations among the retailers and even among individuals
for their daily household necessities. The fact is that associations
like co-operative companies in the United States exist to a very
large extent throughout Germany. ’
It is a well-known fact that each stratum of producers is both
a consumer and a producer. It has therefore resulted quite nat-
urally, although Kartells were originally only producers or selling
Kartells, that they soon became also consumer or buying Kartells in
their relations with producers of materials in all earlier stages of
manufacture.
For example, the different German railroads, the Prussian,
Bavarian, Saxon, etc., have formed an association for establish-
ing, standards for rails and other materials with which the Stahl-
werksverband has to comply. The railroads together need about
one-fourth of its whole production. Their wishes, therefore, carry
enough weight to be respected. The Stahlwerksverband, in its
turn, has not only agreed upon its selling conditions and sales prices,
but on the other hand, by reason of its~large consumption of pig-
iron, is able to dictate its conditions to the pig-iron syndicate, which
again exerts the same double influence, first, toward the Stahlwerks-
verband as its customer, and second, toward the coal syndicate as
the producer of its most important raw material.
These consumer Kartells may not always be considered proof
of the fact that the consumers favor the Kartell, but they surely
offer a very interesting indication of the attitude which consumers
take. Some people might argue that the consumer Kartells are
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formed for the purpose of fighting the producer Kartells and are
therefore an evidence of direct opposition to the new condition of
things. It is my personal opinion, however, that there is no basis at
all for saying that consumers disapprove of industrial combinations;
on the contrary, the consumers realize the advantages of the Kar-
tells for the nation as a whole and consider their existence inevitable.
The consumer Kartells are organized for this very reason, namely,
to be able to deal advantageously with the inevitable.
It may be of interest to quote here some chamber of com-
merce resolutions. A recent report of the Chamber of Commerce
of Bonn states that &dquo; it has to be emphasized again and again that
combinations are absolutely necessary in our time and that they
have proved for the most part beneficial. They alone have been
able to check the boundless competition with all its dangers to social
economy. They have eliminated competition by cutting prices
and has substituted competition in economies of production. Even
the commission houses and dealers who originally disapproved of
them, in most cases have become convinced more and more that
their own interests are, in general, best protected by them.&dquo;
In the first year of the existence of the Stahlwerksverband
the Chamber of Commerce of Luedenscheid, which is situated in
one of the most important districts using semi-manufactured mate-
rial, resolved, &dquo;that the industry suffers from the conduct of the
Stahlwerksverband which exploits for its own benefit the conditions
created by the protective tariff.&dquo; The same chamber of commerce
in its report of the following year no longer objected to the Stahl-
werksverband and praised the &dquo;beneficial influence of the steadiness
of prices as created by the coal syndicate.&dquo;
The Chamber of Commerce of Bochum recognizes that &dquo;fair
and moderate prices are best assured by large combinations.&dquo;
It adds that &dquo;it has to be pointed out that the works which
buy semi-manufactured products from the Stahlwerksverband and
convert them have worked with good profit.&dquo;
Inasmuch as I am a devout believer in the beneficial results
which are to be obtained from a reasonable application of the prin-
ciples of scientific management, and inasmuch as I realize how nieces-
sary it is for the introduction of scientific management in its highest
form that each industry should, as far as possible, be concentrated
horizontally as well as vertically, some people might call me prej-
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udiced in my presentation of the subject. I therefore give you the
following quotations from two of our socialistic labor leaders whom
surely no one could accuse of being prejudiced in favor of employ-
ers’ combinations:
Mr. Hue has frankly acknowledged &dquo;that combinations secure
higher wages and better and safer conditions for the laborers; and
more uniformity in their work.&dquo;
Mr. R. Calwer said &dquo;that the organization of Kartells should
not only be greeted but also aided by the socialistic party.&dquo; It is
an actual fact that associations of workmen have been in some
cases a substantial aid in forming Kartells among the producers, as
the workmen have considered it as the best method of obtaining
better working conditions.2
The many papers and books written on industrial combinations,
the essays and articles published in the &dquo;Kartellrundschau,&dquo; a
monthly publication entirely devoted to this subject, show that
political economists take almost universally a favorable attitude.
Our theorists and progressive producers are beginning to recog-
nize the fact that inasmuch as unification of management assures
quicker response to market conditions and more ease in special-
ization at the different plants, a fusion or amalgamation-please
do not call it &dquo;trust &dquo;-of the various independent producers is
economically a more perfect organization than our Kartells.
Professor Conrad, from the University of Halle, says: &dquo;Only
by means of a monopolistic union can a bird’s-eye view of the world’s
demands be obtained and production regulated and divided up among
the members so that the equilibrium of the world’s industry and
market wiU not be disturbed.&dquo;
In the great majority of our industries, however, combination
has not advanced beyond the Kartell stage. As I stated above,
only the electrical, chemical and coal industries have so far united
in a closer form than the Kartell.
II.
The second part of my subject treats of the policy which the
government pursues in its relations with industrial combinations.
The attitude of the government is expressed in various ways.
2 A recent example of this is to be found in a certain kind of engraving establishments (Wal-
zengravieranstalten).
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First, by legislation3 and by the decisions of courts interpreting the
statutes; second, by the part which the government itself takes in
the active management of industrial enterprises.
In the eighties of the last century the government found itself
confronted by a new economic development. Convinced that this
development had grown out of an irresistible natural law, the govern-
ment did not attempt to check it, but tried to guide it into the ways
most beneficial to the country’s welfare.
When in 1903 the forming of large combinations in the coal
mining industry, banking and inland navigation, attracted notice,
the Imperial Department of the Interior started an investigation
on this subject with the purpose of determining whether or not new
and more stringent legislation was necessary. Debates presided
over by the Department of the Interior were arranged between
manufacturers, managers, officers of large Kartells, professors of
political economy, etc. At the end of all these debates the conclu-
sion was reached that although in some respects great industrial
combinations were undesirable, nevertheless the laws which already
existed were adequate to cope with the undesirable features, and
further it appeared that the great advantages which result from them
more than counterbalance the disadvantages; and that, therefore,
neither private interests nor the interest of the country at large were
being endangered by the development of these combinations.
At about the same period that these debates were taking place,
test cases were instituted against certain of the Kartells. In these
test cases the monopolistic tendencies of the Kartells were pointed
out, and it was alleged that they were unconstitutional and in viola-
tion of the statutory trade regulations (die Gewerbeordnung) because
by eliminating competition they interfered with the freedom of trade.
The cases went through all the courts up to the highest court of the
empire, the Reichsgericht in Leipzig, which handed down the funda-
mental decision that &dquo;the forming of Kartells was not only a justifi-
able manifestation of the instinct of self-preservation, but was a
step actually serving the best interest of the country as a whole.&dquo;
After that the Kartells were attacked on the ground that the
agreements upon which they were based were void under Paragraph
138 of the Civil Code (Buergerliches Gesetzbuch) as &dquo;gegen gute
2 The power to legislate concerning commerce and trade belongs to the empire not to the
several states. (Art. 4 of the German constitution.)
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Sitten,&dquo; which, literally translated may be rendered as &dquo;contrary
to good custom, or good morals.&dquo; If the court had recognized this
point of view it would have meant that each Kartell member might
disregard its Kartell agreement with impunity and it would have
made it impossible to enforce any of the penalties for non-fulfilment
of the Kartell agreement.
It is of great importance for the Kartells that Book 10 of the
Code of Civil Procedure gives the right and provides a method for
taking all litigations resulting from a Kartell agreement out of the
jurisdiction of the ordinary courts and substituting arbitration
courts. The importance of this special jurisdiction is shown best
by the fact that the enemies of the Kartells demand their abolition.
A quick technical expert proceeding is provided hereby which decides
definitely and does therefore not permit obstructions possible in the
ordinary court procedure.
It was also alleged that the Kartells were forbidden by the law
against unfair competition (Gesetz gegen den unlautem Wettbewerb)4
and also by the penal code (Strafgesetzbuch), but the courts refused
to recognize any of these arguments and the Kartells still live and
prosper.
Germany, as you know, has to-day a protective tariff. It has
been suggested that the development of the Kartells could be checked
by lowering the tariff and opening the German market more fully
to foreign competition. No proposition intended to lower the tariff,
however, is looked upon with favor by the German government and
all these suggestions have been rejected.
4 It seems to me that the importance of this statute as a provision against undesirable features
of industrial combinations especially is somewhat overestimated. It might be of value therefore
to give the following outline of the statute:
Section 1 refers to competition which is considered against good morals (contra bonus mores).
Sections 3-10 refer to misrepresentation of facts in advertisements, etc., relating to the adver-
tiser’s own business.
Section 11 refers to the right of the Federal Council (Bundesrat) to demand certain standard
weights and measures for certain goods e. g. beer.
Section 12 refers to the offer of gratuities or other advantages to an employee in order to
obtain a favored position in connection with the purchase of goods.
Section 13 refers to sections 3 to 12 and sets forth the conditions necessary for civil liability.
Section 14 refers to damaging of reputation and credit by statements of unprovable facts, or
Section 15 by statements against better knowledge.
Section 16 refers to the misuse of trade marks, names, etc., likely or intended to create errors
or mistakes.
Section 17 refers to the disclosure of business secrets.
Section 18 refers to the use of business secrets by an employee for his own benefit.
Section 20 refers to offering inducements to disclose business secrets.
The rest of the thirty paragraphs define no more torts but deal largely with procedure.
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Probably the most interesting feature of the government’s
policy toward industrial combinations is the active part which it
takes in their management. In Germany, of course, the railroads,
the telegraph and telephone, and the postal and express services
are all government monopolies.
Furthermore, the government has its finger, sometimes its whole
hand, in all the more important industrial combinations.
For example, in the potash industry, under the recent act, at
the beginning of each year a total expected sale is determined and
to each producer is allotted a certain percentage of this expected
sale. It is also predetermined what part of each producer’s allotted
percentage may be sold in the domestic market and what may be
exported. If the total sale of any producer exceeds his allotted
percentage a duty must be paid to the government on this excess.
Furthermore if a smaller quantity is sold by any producer in the
home market than that provided for a proportionate decrease is
made in the sales permitted in the foreign market. The price in
the foreign market can never be lower than the price in the home
market.
Again, in the coal industry, the government is influential because
it is itself a large mine owner and operator. The government uses
its own coal on its railroads. By an arrangement made within the
last few months, the coal which it does not need for itself, it sells
through the coal syndicate in precisely the same way that the other
members of the syndicate sell.
The government, however, has reserved the right to withdraw
from the syndicate, in case it believes that the syndicate is selling
the coal at prices which are too low to give the government a fair
profit, or on the other hand too high for the public welfare.
It has been said that the best policy to be pursued with combina-
tions would be governmental enterprises strong enough to represent
a working majority in the trade. In 1903 and 1904 the government
started to follow this policy and wanted to obtain a larger influence
in the coal mining industry. It wanted to acquire one of the largest
mining companies, the &dquo; Hibernia,&dquo; but secured only a minority, the
owners of the remaining stock having been combined by the coal
syndicate in a stock company under conditions which made it im-
possible for the government to obtain any more stock.
After this unsuccessful venture into &dquo; High Finance &dquo; the govern-
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ment decided to give up this policy and practically to join the syndi-
cate as shown above.
Coming now to the iron and steel industry, the government,
although not a large iron and steel producer itself, as the manager
and owner of the railroads is a customer, as mentioned before, for
about one-quarter of the German output. Its power to influence
the iron and steel trade is therefore manifest.
I am informed that a bill has just been introduced in the Reich-
stag whereby the government shall have the right of supervision
over all Kartells, similar to the supervision which the various state
governments in this country exercise over the insurance companies.
The fate of this bill is of course still uncertain.
It seems to me that the speech of the Secretary of Commerce,
Dr. Delbrueck, made in the Reichstag on the fourth of March, 1912,
will show best, in a concise way, the government’s attitude towards
this matter, and its future policy. He said: &dquo; Even the gentlemen of
the socialist party have well understood that syndicates are necessary
in the modem development of business and to a certain extent useful.
The accord between demand and supply bring about a stability of
prices and consequently of wages. Therefore, as long as the syndi-
cates do not overstep the bounds of the powers, given them by the
ordinary statutes, we have neither reason nor right to interfere with
them.
&dquo;The united governments (Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony, etc.) com-
prising the Empire as represented in the ’Bundesrat’ (federal council)
are of the opinion that especially the coal syndicate and the Stahl-
werksverband are members of our economic organization which
cannot be dropped forthwith, even if someone should disapprove
their policy in some particulars.
&dquo; I would regret it extremely if the agreement of the coal syn-
dicate should not be renewed in 1916 when the present agreement
expires.
&dquo; It is not possible to answer the general question whether or not
the state as owner of industrial enterprises should join syndicates.
This must be decided on the merits of each individual case. The
right of the state to join a syndicate in case it believes it wise for
economic reasons cannot be contested. It is assumed of course,
that the economic activity of the syndicate in question will not
bring the government into discord with its economic and political
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functions. Sometimes it may be even the obvious duty of the govern-
ment to enter into a syndicate if it can thereby further important
political and economic ends.&dquo;
In summing up, I should like to say that the German people
and the German government seem to feel that the tendency toward
combinations in all forms of industry and business is a result of
modem scientific and economic conditions; that combinations are
necessary for the soundness of the economic life of the country by
securing stability in commerce and sustaining thereby its buying
capacity; that the forming of associations of similar interests, aided
by a reasonable tariff, is desirable and appropriate to benefit not only
the manufacturer but also the workman and the consumer; that
the tendency toward combinations is not a caprice of finance or the
result of the selfishness of the few; that it is not only national but
international; that it is here to stay, and that it is only a question
of regulating the stream, not of damming it.
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